Pronto. A pesada derrota de Ted Cruz nas
primárias do estado de Indiana deixaram o caminho livre para a nomeação de Donald Trump como candidato presidencial dos republicanos à presidenciais do próximo mês de Novembro (até porque entretanto John Kasich, o outro candidato que se ainda estava na corrida,
também já renunciou). O que nos obriga a pensar no impensável, porque esta nomeação era impensável há não muito tempo. Até por Trump não ser verdadeiramente um republicano, muito menos aquilo que os americanos designam como um “conservative”.
Daí que tenha pedido emprestado o título deste Macroscópio a uma revista política de Washington, uma revista ligada aos republicanos e que fazia a sua última capa precisamente com o título
Thinking the Unthinkable: How to survive a Trump presidency. A revista em causa é a Weekly Standard, os autores do texto James W. Ceaser e Oliver Ward, o diagnóstico de partida formula o tal “impensável”: “
Many political analysts today seem to have buried their heads in the sand. The "unthinkable" used to be Donald Trump's selection as the presidential nominee of the Republican party, a previously remote possibility now well within his reach. The prospect of his election as the 45th president of the United States was even more unimaginable. No longer: The Economist's Global Forecasting Service now classifies a Trump presidential victory as a "moderate" probability, with an impact comparable to jihadist terrorism destabilizing the global economy, according to the magazine's risk intensity scale.”
O alarme não vem só do campo republicano. No The Huffington Post, Howard Fineman, Global Editorial Director, não usa meias palavras:
Here Are 7 Reasons Why Donald Trump Could Really Win In November. Que são as seguintes:
“It’s the Economy, Stupid.”; Divided Democrats.; Republican Weakness.; Journalistic Weakness.; Hillary the “Incumbent.”; Trump Turns.; e ainda
The Numbers. Vale a pena conhecê-las uma por uma, mas selecciono apenas esta passagem, sobre Hillary, que mesmo tendo perdido também neste última noite, não deverá deixar de ser a candidata dos democratas: “
As much as Clinton talks about new ideas and a fresh start, she will be attempting the difficult task of holding the White House for the same party for a third-straight term. That last happened in 1988. More important, Clinton and her husband represent a force in the Democratic Party that is a kind of incumbency within an incumbency, and that is a perilous place to be at a time when voters so despise Washington.”
Bem, mas como foi que chegámos aqui? Eis alguns textos dos últimos dias e horas que procuram uma resposta:
- How Donald Trump Won the G.O.P. Nomination, de John Cassidy, na New Yorker, conta-nos o grau de surpresa com que esta nomeação está a ser recebida, um grau de surpresa que favoreceu Trump, que os seus adversários subestimaram-no demasiado tempo: “Historians and political scientists will be debating for decades how Trump got to this point, but any convincing explanation must acknowledge his talents as a demagogue and pugilist. Speaking on CNN last night, David Axelrod, one of the many commentators who initially dismissed Trump’s candidacy, said, “He’s proven himself to be very resourceful and very skilled.” Axelrod pointed, in particular, to Trump’s mastery of television and social media. On Fox, Rich Lowry, the editor of National Review, which has been in the vanguard of the Never Trump movement, said, “I have to tip my hat to what Trump has achieved.” Citing the fact that Trump didn’t have any pollsters or, until recently, any political organization to speak of, Lowry added, “It is completely incredible.”
- How Trump won the nomination, uma análise dos correspondentes do Financial Times, um texto que combina notas de reportagem com alguma reflexão política. Por exemplo: “While many consider him a bully, Mr Trump has shown an uncanny ability to label his rivals with nicknames that stick, such as “Little Marco” Rubio, “Lyin’ Ted” Cruz, and “Low Energy” Jeb Bush. He has already begun referring to “Crooked Hillary”. At campaign rallies from Iowa to Indiana, Republican voters repeatedly said that they were tired of Washington politicians and believed Mr Trump would return jobs to the US and “Make America Great Again”. Maria, a Hispanic (…), said that while she did not agree completely with the tycoon’s immigration policy (…) she considered him the best candidate. “You know what he is getting,” she said. “He is not faking it. He is not a flip-flopper.”
- Los republicanos asumen finalmente que Trump será el candidato, um texto no El Pais onde se procura explicar como a elite republicana de Washington perdeu a batalha contra o magnate de Nova Iorque. Marc Bassets lembra que, “Con Trump, las élites han pasado por las famosas cinco etapas del duelo que categorizó la psiquiatra suiza Elisabeth Kübler-Ross: negación, ira, negociación, depresión y aceptación. Primero despreciaron el fenómeno Trump. Después le atacaron, a veces con sus propias armas retóricas. Buscaron sin éxito alternativas. Y cayeron en la melancolía por los malos resultados que podía traerles. Finalmente, llega la hora de asumir que él es el candidato inevitable.”
Coloca-se agora uma primeira interrogação o que será do Partido Republicano com Trump? Que futuro para o partido de Lincoln e Reagan? Sobre isso mesmo reflecte Bret Stephens, colunista do conservador Wall Street Journal, em
The GOP Gets What It Deserves, um texto onde defende que “‘
America First’ is the inevitable outcome of the Republican descent into populism.” Conta a história de como o partido passou do Céu ao Inferno em pouco tempo: “
In 2014, the “Republican establishment,” as it is now derisively known, succeeded in securing its largest ever majority in the House since 1928. It won nine seats in the Senate and regained the majority for the first time in eight years. The GOP also took control of 31 governorships, with historic gains in state legislatures. These were significant political achievements, which only awaited a reasonably serious presidential candidate to lead to a sweeping Republican restoration. Instead, Mr. Cruz used the moment to attempt a party coup by treating every tactical or parliamentary difference of opinion as a test of ideological purity. The party turned on its own leaders, like the much-vilified Mr. Boehner. Then it turned on its (classically) liberal ideas, like free trade and sensible immigration policy.”
A The Atlantic aborda o tema de uma forma mais analítica, mas bastante cruel, num longo mas informado texto intitulado
The Day the Republican Party Died. Aí Molly Ball defende que “
This is the contrarian’s case against the pundits’ consensus, and for Trump winning: that his idiosyncratic platform and anti-establishment fervor will disrupt the partisan stalemate and reorder the traditional fault lines of American politics. Some of his supporters see him as a new kind of Republican reformer, one whose lack of loyalty to the party frees him to adopt more popular positions that can attract nontraditional GOP voters.”
Será assim? As sondagens não parecem apontar nesse sentido, como mostra Thomas B. Edsall no New York Times em
The Great Trump Reshuffle. Fazendo uma análise fina da base eleitoral de Donald Trump, nesse texto analisa-se a penetração da sua mensagem em vários grupos sociais e étnicos, assim mostrando que o seu discurso está a abalar algumas das fronteiras tradicionais da política americana. Por um lado, “
A Trump versus Clinton contest will deepen the partisan divisions that have set those who support the social and cultural revolutions of the past five decades on race, immigration, women’s rights, gender equality and gay rights — as well as the broader right to sexual privacy — against those who remain in opposition.” Sendo que, do ponto de vista demográfico, a candidatura de Trump agravará os problemas já sentidos pelos republicanos: “
The nomination of Donald Trump will sharpen and deepen the Republican Party’s core problems. Trump gains the party ground among declining segments of the population — less well educated, less well off whites — and loses ground with the growing constituencies: single women, well-educated men and women, minorities, the affluent and professionals.”
Não surpreende por isso que, entre os republicanos, exista já quem fale de uma terceira candidatura, mesmo correndo o risco de com isso dividir profundamente o partido. É o que faz William Kristol na revista que já citei, a Weekly Standard, em
The Trump Temptation, onde procura contrariar os argumentos de um editorial do Wall Street Journal,
The Third-Party Temptation. Este último defende que “
A conservative challenge to Trump could cost the GOP the House”, e desenvolve um raciocínio centrado na ideia de que os republicanos devem sobretudo tratar de defender as maiorias que têm tanto na Câmara dos Representantes como no Senado. .Já Kristol, mesmo sendo republicano, não tem dúvidas: “
Donald Trump should not be president of the United States”, isto porque
“t his is a man whose temperament and character render him unfit to be president of the United States”. Por isso não aceita os cálculos do jornal financeiro de Nova Iorque.
É uma discussão que promete, precisamente porque o impensável aconteceu e, como se escreve no Politico, em
5 takeaways from the night that made Trump nominee, a hipótese de um “terceiro partido” é mesmo real: “
There are, of course, major hurdles to mounting a third-party bid this late — but expect talk of Trump alternatives to grow. There’s already a counter campaign emerging, urging the GOP to take a one-time hit in order to hasten a bright post-Donald future.”
E assim estamos, como ninguém esperava estar, nem os democratas. Faltam seis meses para a eleições e tudo quando podemos dizer, depois de termos visto o que já vimos, é que seis meses é muito tempo.
Tenham um bom descanso, que aqui nos reencontraremos amanhã.
